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II. STATEMENT OF THE COURTS' JURISDICTION
This is a domestic law case for which an Appeal lies directly to this court pursuant to
the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3(2)(h) and (j). The Third District Court entered a final Order
dismissing the Appellant's Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce on the 1st day of August,
2001. (Record pp. 148 to 150); (Addendum No. 9). The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court on the 9th day of August, 2001. (Record pp. 151 to 155);
(Addendum No. 12). The case was transferred to this court by an Order of the Utah Supreme
Court which was entered pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

The Legal Issues Presented on Appeal:
1.

The ultimate issue to be determined is whether or not the Third District Court

acted properly in granting the Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment when it dismissed
the Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 111 to 113).
2.

Whether the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce states a prima

facie cause of action for either: (i) an omitted marital asset, or (ii) a claim of a material
change in circumstances that has arisen since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce
thereby justifying a review of the original property division order of the District Court.
(Record pp. 45 to 50).
3.

Whether there existed any disputed facts thereby preventing a ruling on the

Motion of Summary Judgment in favor of the Respondent as to both cause of actions as set
forth in the Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 111 to 113).
-1-

4.

Whether the claims set forth in the Petition could properly be decided on a

Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law at such an early stage of the proceedings
and without the benefit of any discovery. (Record pp. 111 to 113).
5.

Whether the Motion for Summary Judgment was premature as a matter of law

in that discovery in the case had not yet been undertaken as to the omitted nature of the asset
or if there has been a substantial change in the circumstances since the entry of the Decree
of Divorce. (NOTE: The Appellant had already filed her Initial Disclosures as well as two
(2) Financial Declaration Forms in the hopes of expediting the disclosure of the financial
facts regarding the case. This was done in order to minimize the cost of the proceeding for
all parties.) (Record pp. 107 to 109, 116 to 127, 141 to 147).
6.

Whether the moving party (i.e. the Defendant/Appellee) provided an adequate

Affidavit as to all material facts sufficient to support the Motion for Summary Judgment and
whether the Affidavit was sufficient to counter the change in circumstances as described in
the Affidavit filed by Ms. Foulger in opposition to the relief. (Record pp. 60 to 69). [NOTE:
The moving party's supporting Affidavit was not made part of the record in the Third District
Court.] (Addendum No. 5).
B.

The Standard of Review on Appeal of the District Court's Legal Rulings.
1.

When reviewing an order by the District Court granting Summary Judgment,

the party against whom the motion has been brought against is entitled to have all the facts
presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered by the reviewing court in
the light most favorable to him. Trevor Thompson v. Connie Jess 1999 UT 22, If 12,979 P.2d

-2-

322; Lawrence Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953); A,
Wayne Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Because Summary Judgment
is granted as a matter of law and only if the person is otherwise legally entitled to the relief
sought, the Appellate Court is free to review de novo all of the trial court's legal conclusions
and any related rulings thereto. Tim Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah
1979): FrankM. Barbery. Farmers Ins. Exch. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988): A. Wavne
Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
2.

The Court should review the Third District Court's rulings as to the law under

the "correction of error" standard. Malibu Investment Company v. Kathy Sparks 2000 UT
30, f 12, 996 P.2d 1043; TRF v. Rav Felan 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); R. Owen
Neerings v. Utah State Bar 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991).
IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Statutory Provisions:
UCA §30-3-5(1) (Disposition of Property) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. (Balance of this portion of the statute is omitted).
UCA §30-3-5(3) (Courts to have Continuing Jurisdiction) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case.
Ms. Foulger f/k/a Mrs. Mitchell filed a Petition in the Third District Court seeking to

either amend or modify a Decree of Divorce previously entered by the court in the fall of
1977. (Record pp. 30 to 34; 45 to 50); (Addendum Nos. 1 and 2). The Petition was framed
in the alternative. The Petition first sought a division of the vested private retirement benefits
of Mr. Mitchell that had not been addressed or adjudicated in the original Decree of Divorce.
(Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). This was an omitted asset. In the alternative, it
was a Petition to Modify the property division provisions of the Decree of Divorce on
account of a substantial and material change in circumstances that have arisen since the entry
of the Decree of Divorce in 1977. (Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2).
With respect to the omitted marital asset claim, Mr. Mitchell raised the affirmative
legal defense of res judicata in his Answer. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 3). The
Appellee's legal position (when more closely examined) is both simple and direct. Mr.
Mitchell claims that the property matters once adjudicated cannot thereafter be changed
despite the provisions of UCA §30-3-5(3). There is no case law that supports this unique
interpretation of the governing statute. Mr. Mitchell also failed to affirmatively declare that
the District Court had in fact adjudicated the retirement asset in one (1) fashion or another.
(Addendum No. 5). The record shows no reference to the asset whatsoever.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The Appellant filed the Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce in the Third District
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Court on the 28th day of January, 2001. (Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). An
Answer to the Petition on the merits was filed with the District Court by the Respondent on
the 16th day of February, 2001. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 3). On March 14th,
2001, the Appellee moved for Summary Judgment. (Record p. 58 to 59); (Addendum No.
4). No discovery had been initiated by either party at the time the Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed. A Rule 26 conference had not yet been held or even scheduled by the
parties. Ms. Foulger did file her required initial disclosures on April 25,2001. (Record pp.
107 to 109). Mr. Mitchell failed to file any initial disclosures. Under the current Utah Civil
Procedural Rules, formal discovery could not be undertaken at that time by either party. See
Rule 26(d).
The Motion to Dismiss was first heard by the Commissioner. The Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the Petition. (Record p. 110, 134 to 135); (Addendum No.
8). The Petitioner filed an objection to the recommendation. (Record p. I l l ) ; (Addendum
No. 7). The objection was then heard by Trial Judge, Bruce Lubeck, sitting in place of the
regularly assigned Judge Anne M. Stirba. (Record p. 140). The District Court ultimately
sustained the Commissioner's ruling and granted the Motion to Dismiss. (Record pp. 148
to 150); (Addendum No. 9). The period of time between the filing of the Petition and the
hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Petition was less than six (6) months.
Ms. Foulger, in her objection to the Commissioner's ruling, raised a number of items.
(Record pp. 111 to 113); (Addendum No.7). The objections were based upon the following
legal grounds:
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1.

The actual failure to divide the vested private retirement benefits. (Record p.

112); (Addendum No. 7).
2.

A claim of a substantial change in circumstances. (Record p. 112).

3.

The Motion for Summary Judgment was premature. (Record p. 112).

4.

The inadequacy of Mr. Mitchell's affidavit. (Record p. 112).

5.

No clear entitlement to an order of dismissal at that time. (Record p. 112).

6.

The inappropriateness of res judicata in the present case. (Record p. 112).

The Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on the 9th
day of August, 2001. (Record p. 151 to 155); (Addendum No. 12). The case was then
removed to this court by the Order of the Supreme Court under Rule 44 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
C.

Statement of the Core Facts.
The Affidavit of Mr. Mitchell was provided to the nonmoving party and it was used

and referred to during the course of the proceedings before the District Court. It is unknown
if the District Court actually had the pleadings before it when it was considering the matter.
However, the Affidavit and the moving party's supporting Memorandum were not made part
of the indexed record in the case. This disclosure is made to this court pursuant to Rule 3.3
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Addendum No. 5)
Because this was a ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment, all controlling facts
must be considered in a light that is most favorable to the Appellant. Lawrence Morris v.
Famsworth Motel 123 Ut. 289,259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953); Daniel English v. Albert Kienke
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774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). The very limited facts, as stated by Mr. Mitchell, is not
found in the record and fails to set forth critical events. (See Addendum No. 5). The
following are the controlling facts for purposes of this case. These facts are established in
the trial record by the fact intensive Affidavit of the Appellant, Ms. Foulger. (Record pp. 60
to 69); (Addendum No. 6). See also the specific facts as alleged in the Petition. (Record pp.
45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2).
(Background Information)
1.

Ruth Foulger is 59 years of age having been born on the 26th day of June, 1942,

in American Fork, Utah. (Foulger Aff. ^|6).
2.

The Petitioner is a bone fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

(Foulger Aff. f7).
3.

There were four (4) children born of the marriage. The children are all now

adults. There are no children in need of any financial support. (Foulger Aff. f 8).
4.

The Petitioner is a single individual and she was not gainfully employed at the

time the Petition to modify was filed. (Foulger Aff. Tf9).
5.

At the time of the divorce in October of 1977, the Mr. Mitchell was gainfully

employed on a full-time basis. He was the primary provider of financial support for the
family and his wife. (Foulger Aff. ^J10).
(Omitted Retirement Benefits)
6.

The Petitioner's former spouse (i.e. Donald R. Mitchell) was and continues to

be a participant in a retirement plan in which he had accrued and vested financial benefits.
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(Foulger Aff. f l l ) .
7.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the court and the parties

wholly failed to divide the retirement benefits that had accrued during the continuation of the
marriage. (Foulger Aff. Tfl2). [See also Record pp. 1 to 34.]
8.

The Decree of Divorce is silent as to any division or the actual award of this

specific marital asset as to either party. (Foulger Aff. <||13); (Record pp. 30 to 34);
(Addendum No. 1).
9.

The retirement benefit was an omitted financial asset that the Third District

Court failed to divide. (Foulger Aff. |14); (Record pp. 1 to 34).
(Further Division of Marital Assets)
10.

The Third District Court was requested by the Petitioner to divide the

retirement asset based upon the Petitioner's actual needs at this time. These new financial
needs did not exist on the date of the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in late 1977.
(Foulger Aff. |15).
11.

At the time of the entry of the original Decree of Divorce, the present

retirement benefit was an omitted asset and was not addressed or even compromised in the
Decree of Divorce or by any Agreement of the parties. The Petitioner has claimed a
beneficial interest in the asset. The wife has requested that this employee benefit be
appropriately apportioned in a fair and equitable manner. (Foulger Aff. Tfl6).
(The Petitioner's Demonstrated Need and Changed Circumstances)
12.

The Petitioner (i.e. Ruth Foulger) is now totally disabled. She has been fully
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disabled for the past ten (10) months at the very least (Foulger Aff. ^ 17). [NOTE: The ten
(10) month period is referring to the point in time when the Motion for Summary Judgment
was being considered by the Third District Court.]
13.

Prior to becoming totally disabled, the Petitioner was a licensed clinical social

worker and was self-employed in a modest private practice. Ms. Foulger had been in
practice for about twelve (12) years prior to the date of the filing of the Petition to modify
the Decree of Divorce. (Foulger Aff. TJ18).
14.

The private practice has been abandoned by the time the Petition was filed

because of the Petitioner's existing and significant medical conditions and problems. The
private practice is no longer producing any income at this time and none is expected in the
future. (Foulger Aff. ffi[19 and 22).
15.

The Petitioner is fully disabled and she is not gainfully employed in any

occupation or calling whatsoever. She is dependent upon others for personal assistance and
the government has her financial support. (Foulger Aff. ^|20). [NOTE: The wife is now
receiving social security disability benefits and is living in a subsidized housing project.]
16.

The Petitioner is under the care and treatment of various medical doctors and

healthcare providers for her present medical condition and the associated emotional
problems. These conditions are severe and they appear to be permanent. A listing of at least
twelve (12) healthcare providers for Ms. Foulger was attached to the Affidavit of the
Petitioner. (Foulger Aff. ^|21).
17.

The Petitioner's present physical and mental disability is on account of at least
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the following medical conditions and recent events:
1.

Medical complications of both the mind and body.

2.

Strokes (many occurrences over a number of years).

3.

Heart disease and related complications due to a defect in the heart.

4.

Mental degeneration of a significant degree due in part to the strokes.

5.

Open heart surgery on November 21, 2000.

6.

A genetic blood clotting disorder which is potentially lethal.

7.

Chronic asthma.

8.

Arterial fibrillation.

9.

Chronic bronchitis.

10.

Cognitive deficits with communicative linguistic impairment (moderate
to severe in nature) due to the various strokes.

11.

Right side body neglect due to the various strokes in recent years.

12.

Impaired vision and an impaired visual field due in part to the strokes.

13.

Depression relating to the medical conditions.

14.

Stress of a generalized nature.

15.

Additional surgery for a collapsed lung due to significant blood clotting
on November 27, 2000.

16.

Right side body weakness which is a complicating medical condition.

17.

Lack of physical sensation on the right side of the body.

18.

Impaired mobility due to the above medical conditions. (Foulger Aff.
122).

18.

None of the above medical conditions were known to exist at the time of the
-10-

27.

2.

Strokes (many occurrences over a number of years).

3.

Heart failure due to a defect in the heart.

4.

Mental degeneration of a significant degree.

5.

Open heart surgery on November 21, 2000.

6.

A genetic clotting disorder which is potentially lethal.

7.

Chronic asthma.

8.

Arterial fibrillation.

9.

Chronic bronchitis.

10.

Cognitive deficits with communicative linguistic impairment (moderate
to severe in nature).

11.

Right side body neglect due to the various strokes.

12.

Impaired vision and an impaired visual field.

13.

Depression relating to the above conditions.

14.

Stress of a generalized nature. (Foulger Aff. Tf31).

None of the present medical conditions were known to exist at the time of the

entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1977. These are material changes of circumstances which
are of a significant degree. (Foulger Aff. 132).
28.

None of these medical conditions were foreseen nor were they foreseeable

when the original Decree of Divorce was entered by the Third District Court. (Foulger Aff.
133).
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court improperly granted Summary Judgment dismissing the case.
-12-

entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1977. (Foulger Aff. Tf23).
(History of the Marital Asset)
19.

The parties were married to each other on October 12,1961 in Salt Lake City,

Utah. (Foulger Aff. f24).
20.

The marriage lasted for a substantial period of time consisting of 16 years.

(Foulger Aff. f25).
21.

On October 3, 1977, the Third District Court entered a Decree of Divorce as

between the parties. (Foulger Aff. Tf26).
22.

The Decree of Divorce was last amended in January of 1981 and this

amendment did not address or concern the claims set forth in the Petition and how they relate
to her present medical condition and her demonstrated financial needs. (Foulger Aff. ^27).
23.

The Respondent has vested retirement benefits which he is now receiving from

his former employer, Kennecott Copper Corporation. (Foulger Aff. Tf28).
24.

During the course of the marriage, Mr. Mitchell was employed and was

covered by a retirement plan. The retirement asset is and was a marital asset. (Foulger Aff.
1f29).
25.

The Petitioner has no vested private retirement benefits or private disability

benefits of any kind. (Foulger Aff. TJ30).
26.

The substantial change in circumstances that have arisen in this case includes,

but is not limited to, the following:
1.

Medical complications of the mind and body.
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B.

The District Court did not apply the correct two (2) step legal analysis when

ruling on Mr. Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment.
C.

The District Court improperly applied the legal doctrine of res judicata.

D.

The District Court failed to take into account the applicability of UCA §30-3-

5(3) as it relates to the established facts of this case.
E.

The District Court failed to properly consider the significant change in the

personal and financial circumstances of Ms. Foulger that had arisen since the entry of the
Decree of Divorce in 1977.
F.

The District Court prematurely considered the Motion. The Trial Judge should

have postponed any ruling on the Motion until after discovery had been completed.
G.

The Affidavit filed by the moving party in support of the Motion is insufficient

to overcome the facts as stated by Ms. Foulger in her Affidavit as to the omitted status of the
asset or the occurrence of change in circumstances since the entry of a Decree of Divorce.
[The Affidavit of Mr. Mitchell is missing in the record as indexed, but such was actually
received by opposing counsel.]
VII. ARGUMENT
The Standard of Review on a Motion for
Summary Judgment is to Determine if There as a
Substantial Dispute Over a Material Fact.
The Trial Court failed to apply the correct legal standard and analysis in this case.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a moving party is entitled to
Summary Judgment for the relief the moving party is seeking, if there is no genuine issue as
-13-

to any material fact, and provided the moving parly is liPiiillielVs!'! ctidilnl lo a judgment as
a matter of law. This is a two (2) step legal process that the court must apply, 11 u »i . H n i
legal requirement must be satisfied even if there is no dispute as to any material fact.
TL/ivfbtY,, Ihi iii'i'in iii|j; (wirl \ iiiust also demonstrate that the party is entitled to the specific
relief sought as a matter of law. Margaret Dooly (ilwcll v. Thomas A. Clark 658 V, Id ;iK>
(Utah 1982)

This second legal requirement means that: (i) the relit

moving party must be proper despite the facts as asserted by the nonmoving party, and (ii)
the \t\\\ I1. • lu applied in the case is both clear and specific, and supports the relief sought.
Asa ycoiiitl nil

.i |r,nh .lumihl s\ 11« >i I • .i inohnn loi 'Summary Judgment has been

brought is entitled to have all facts and all reasonable inferen* t"s inn h JI i«,int? IhiTt In mi
considered in light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lawrence Morris v. Farnsworth
Motel Hi ill. 2XV, iy> l\2d 3) / (Utah 1953); Daniel English v. Albert Kienke 774 l\2d
1J>1 (IHaht'l.App

\{m\

As a general rule, the pleadings niv ,.mi iuffinnii i„!„ and , I (IHIIIMK V\ («.> i;u .L Ltn
issue of fact. Joseph H. Dupler v. Maurice Yates 10 Ut.2d 251. 351 P.2d 624 (I Hali l%0)
United American Life Insurance Co. v. Gary J. Willev 21 Ut.2d 2795 444 P.2d 755 (Utah
19681 A party rni.in m I u Iv upon IIIC L\ 11 qj a I ions in the pleadings to counter Affidavits that
are made from personal knowledge statin L> tails 1 kit .in; cmmais' IO i In •si*.illegal in ilu; OIIKM1
party's pleadings. Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975
party cannot rely upon the mere allegations or denial set forth in their pleadings in order to
avoid Siiniiiijii y liitlgintii

parts must set forth specific facts showing that there are
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genuine issues to be resolved by the fact finder at the time of trial. Lucille J. Thornock v.
Lois S. Cook 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Calvin N. Hall v. Perrv C. Fitzgerald 671 P.2d 224
(Utah 1983). In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Foulger filed a very
detailed Affidavit as to the underlying facts of the case, (Record pp. 60 to 69); (Addendum
No. 6). The Affidavit described a clear omission of the asset from the Decree of Divorce.
This was not rebutted by Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Foulger's Affidavit described important
personal and economic facts that did not exist in 1977 when the Decree of Divorce was
entered.
In order for a non-moving party to successfully oppose a Motion for Summary
Judgment, it is not necessary that the party proves its legal theory or defense. It is only
necessary for the non-moving party to identify specific facts which controvert the facts as
stated in the moving partyfs Affidavit. Salt Lake City Corporation v. James Constructors,
Inc. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Mr. Mitchell did not set forth any lengthy history or recitation of the controlling facts
of the case. (Addendum No. 5). He failed to state whether the retirement benefits were dealt
with by the District Court in any fashion whatsoever. In his Answer, he merely declares (in
Paragraph 8 thereof) that it was not a marital asset. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No.
3). He failed to produce an^ facts that were contrary to those stated by the Appellant
regarding her changed personal, financial, and medical condition since the entry of the
Decree of Divorce. In his filed Answer, he merely glosses over the allegations in Paragraphs
11 and 12. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 3). His supporting Affidavit is only eight
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(8) brief paragraphs in length. (Addendum No \ i 1 UK \cau\)uu\ mi ibe undisputed facts
(based upon a very abbreviated affidavit) wholly fails to address the spa if it legal ivMies
raised in the petition of (:>k ~n omitted marital asset, or (ii) the claim of changed
MI imi^iinavs (it .1 Mj.»ui(i(.

nature and that the changes arose after the entry of the Decree

of Divorce. These are facta

>n\ \ ' s , v a ) '

the

Trial Court after hearing the evidence. These facts cann
nonmoving party by means of Summary Judgment as was done in this case. Ms. Foulger is
e

icts construed in a light most favorable to her. The moving party failed

to establish dvm r\ iJiihr II il lltr cliiiiii'i » iivumslmici'N, iis described by Ms. Foulger, are
irrelevant to the case and that no relief in clearly prope
clearly presents a case in which modification may be proper for two (2) reasons.
The District Court failed to apply the proper legal standard and rules of law involving
Sumiiiiii "i Itnli'iii nl II i. .m i inn nl Liv1., Ihat is corrected by means of an appeal. :
Summary Judgment Should Not Be Granted by the
Trial Court, if Discovery is Incomplete or Ongoing
or Until a Reasonable Period has Elapsed.
As a matter of law, the hasty ruling by the Trial Court in granting Summary Judgment
41wl 111itl i case law, As a general rule, Summary Judgment on
an} ~aii^ ul action should be denied i i

I

IVJNI

pu .l|ioiiul in hi iIiNttnci") has been

substantially completed since information sought during the course of discovery muv 111 ih:
genuine issues of material facts sufficient to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Downtown Athletic Club v. S.M. Horman 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). These same
-10-

discovered facts could also suggest that the moving party is not entitled to the relief that the
party is seeking. The Trial Court has the power to postpone a hearing or ruling on the
moving party's motion until each party has had a reasonable time in which to complete
discovery. This was not done. This postponement of the matter was requested by Ms.
Foulger, and was procedurally denied by the Trial Court.

(Record pp. 76 and 88);

(Addendum No. 7).
There was no opportunity to conduct any discovery by the parties as it relates to the
facts and the specific legal issues that are raised in this case. The right to conduct discovery
was barred to each party under the Utah Civil Procedure Rules. See Rule 26(d). The facts
and legal issues should have been developed by the parties before the District Court could
properly render a considered ruling on the merits of the Petition. Mr. Mitchell had not filed
any disclosures. It is clear that both the required disclosures and discovery could shed some
light on the case and which may impact the court's two (2) step legal analysis of the case.
The Third District Court failed to give the Appellant time to develop evidence in support of
each separate cause of action. This was clear prejudicial error of law and should be reversed
by this court.
Summary Judgment Can Only Be Granted If
Appropriate Affidavits Meeting Specific Factual
Requirements are Filed by the Moving Party.
The moving party's Motion and Supporting Affidavit was not sufficient to show that
he was entitled to the dismissal of the case as a matter of law. In addition, the Motion before
the District Court did not establish that the facts as claimed by the Appellant are wholly
-17-

irrelevant to the resolution <P( Mir fv »"« i > |t jiji ., inj,«i <ii .uiii'ii1. ciisccl fir llit" Petition.
(Record pp. 58 to 59); (Addendum No. 4). The moving party's Affidavit and su|ipnriing
Memorandum are not in the indexed record in this case.
Whui a I" 11 ml in in I oi Summary Judgment is filed, the Affidavits of the moving party
and the Affidavits of the mm im" HIJ! |Mil' «»us( <I < idain specific eudentiary facts w hich
clearly indicate that there is or is not a genuine issue for trial. Graham 1 Treloggan v. Curtis
L. Treloggan 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985), As a general rule, any witness including a party
v

i; personal knowledge of the facts can make an Affidavit as t< : .. naterial facts.
; - * < * ' L111 I(* ' * >11

Wesici'i. i'jKjliv.; u.UL>i.'iit i „i... t ^cin v c State Agriculture uo-Up ;
• <> Mr. Mitchell, in his Affidavit, fails to ste*

u

**

;

• .is in I.IU

addressed and then describe what action the court took regarding the same. This omission
of important evidence is important because he does state that he was familiar with the history
M| (In cast

I' "IN,, '\ff"i(l;i'\»' 'it iiieieh declares dial lie was employed with Kennecott

Copper and that both parties were aware <if 11n oln IUIIS i Aililcmlmii Nn »i I In A Midi ml
falls far short of stating what, if any, thing was said or done about the vested pri\ ate
retirement benefits. If they had been addressed, then he could have stated what was done.
Thr

O l i ••* H ' . M

*,i • .in >" M'UM'uJ Xvsef

.

. ••

In this case, the Affidavit of Mr, M i k h d l doiM, nol .uKlrc^s (in; iniporliinl .illemsihulegal cause of action raised in the case of a material change in circumstances. (Record pi
to •* MI u> (>9); (Addendum Nos. 2 and 6). Mr. Mitchell's Affidavit does not disclose facts
"Hi,i) ( "M»ve thai the »vlirt (n ihc lorm of dismissal) on this specific claim was proper as a
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matter of law. The filed Affidavit of Mr. Mitchell fails to even address the claim of a
material change in circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce let alone dispute
it. (Addendum No. 5). The Affidavit fails to identify facts that clearly demonstrate that the
modification authority of the court under UCA §30-3-5(3) is wholly unwarranted in this case
both legally and factually. The Affidavit fails to describe how that the retirement benefits
were before the court and how they were addressed by the court in its Decree of Divorce or
in its Findings of Facts. (Record pp. 27 to 29).
Assets and Income Streams Acquired
During a Marriage can be Divided and Even
Modified by the District Court.
It is acknowledged that marriage is properly viewed as the pooling of the resources
of the couple. Estate of Gorrel 740 P. 2d 267 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
When the parties seek a divorce, then the assets and liabilities of the marriage must
be fairly divided by the Trial Court. David L. Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). There is no set formula for dividing property other than the general
proposition that all divisions must be fair, equitable, and reasonably necessary for the
protection and the support of the parties. UCA §30-3-5(1); Joel H. Izatt v. Mary C. Izatt 627
P.2d49 (Utah 1981): Margaret Fletcher v. William I. Fletcher 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
The courts have recognized that the division of assets and debts need not be equal. Helen
Narango v. Jose L. Narango 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (specifically holding that
separate premarital property can be divided and even awarded to the other party for good
cause shown). The Utah supreme Court has also declared that premarital property or
-19-

separate property may be divided between flic piiMio- >* In "f I'V linis of ihe case warrant
such relief Joel H. Izatt v. Marv C. Izatt 627 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981); KathrynM. NewN lever
v. Teddy P. NewMeyer 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1997) (holding that premarital or separate assets
jiov bv .tn.inial I" llvr oilin ',|'nnsc): Helen Burke v. Edward Burke 73? P.2d 133 (Utah
1987) (holding that separate assets and inhe i ? t -

ie facts of the case

warrant such action).
The courts have declared that there must be a reasonable, objective, and systematic
di\ "Mon i»l tlii: |»h»pun it nil was accumulated during the marriage. David Burt v. Betty Burt
799 P.2d 1166 (Utah C( \ p| i

- . assets may loose its identity

as such if the other spouse adds to its value ur protects

I imcl "it ml \\ n\).

The courts have long held that a marital asset is determined by the existence ot a
nidiilull relationship and not by whose name appears on the asset as being the legal or
beneficial title

OVMRT

iiinl'1'" "-uk"1 or lo'l'/nil1 I m

Kellie K. Jackson v. Mark Allen Jackson

617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) (holding that title

He

court can order a change in the title or the ownership of assets if the case warrants ilic SH"M ;)
jurts have declared that when dividing the assets and the liabilities of the
marriage

.=

se becomes"

a public charge". David L.

Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325 ("I Jtah ("I \ \ <"f i I' W " i
The retirement benefits that accrued during the seventeen (17) \vm mania,!,?!1 ,ur
marilitl assets by legal definition. They are also subject to division and to later modification
lor

C:I«ISC

Jiowit ("liiMuii" U llu p u l s i o n s ul I ll A §§30-3-5(1) and (3). This continuing
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authority of the court includes the ability to apportion assets that are separate or even
premarital in nature in appropriate circumstances.
The Trial Court is Required to Divide
All of the Assets of the Marriage.
One of the legal claims that was asserted in the Petition of Ms. Foulger is that the
Third District Court failed to divide all of the assets of the marriage. (Record pp. 45 to 50);
(Addendum No. 2). The court did not identify, let alone divide, the husband's retirement
benefits. (Record pp. 1 to 34). They are not even mentioned in the District Court record
leading up to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. This was a mistake that arose during the
course the original divorce proceeding. (Record pp. 30 to 34); (Addendum No. 1). The
provisions of UCA §30-3-5(1) provides and even mandates that a Trial Court must divide all
of the assets and obligations of the marriage. This is an affirmative obligation imposed
initially upon the Trial Court. This statutory duty clearly existed in October of 1977. The
requirement of a division does not mean that each spouse must be awarded a specific portion
of each existing asset. What the statute and the case law requires is that all of the assets (both
marital and separate) be identified and then awarded to either or to both parties in some
identified, objective, and systematic fashion. The court cannot fail to discharge its statutory
duty and fail to address all of the assets of the marriage in one fashion or the other. Failure
to do so constitutes an omission of the item from the provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
(Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). It does not matter whether or not it was the
parties or the court that was responsible for the omission. Laura Thompson v. Brent
Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) (noting that a marital debt in the form of a car loan was
-21-

not addressed in the original Decree of Divorce nn<l llus omission inslilied ;i modification of
the Decree even though the parties were fully aware of the debt when the Deere* • i > I' I > i \ • ive
was actually entered). When faced with an error or omission, the party may seek relief from
ii i iiiiliii Rule v I mi In mi independent action as was done in this case.
An independent action

: nas occurred, but for

which a motion to correct the error is time barred. Gary Egan v. Nancy I'igan :MV() I* ,M , 01
(Utah 1977) (a case involving a claim on non-paternity that arose more than six (6) months
al'hi llic iJectTi" ol Divorce was entered).
This statutoi \ iliii i ,m<l JIHIKII M \ ut ijri n\c assus and debts have existed under Utah
state law in substantially the same form for many \eat> h»i cs.mipli

i MIIIUII i fun

m

was contained in UCA §40-3-5(1943). The Utah courts have long declared that this specific
statute allows a court to review family law matters not only at the time of divorce itself but
also .ii ;i I.Her clad1 upon slims UIL1 ul a siikslanlial change in circumstances. RuthM. Dixon
v. William D. Dixon 121 Ul 2595 240 P ,\i i " I 11 1

'- "|

> \ >« n inc asset was

adequately addressed in the original pleadings and was not a mistake or
the Decree of Divorce as it relates to property matters is still subject to additional review
upon ptoi »('<)(" a siihslmilh.il Jinnee in circumstances. I JC A §30-3-5(3); Laura Thompson v.
Brent Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985).
This court has decreed that where the record and the decree is without :mv reference
io (he change circumstances as claimed in the Petition, then it is axiomatic that the events
n ere

u i < iiilcmpl.iled ai line UHR: ul the entry ofthe original Decree ofDivorce. Frances R.
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Bolliger v. Ronald E. Bolliger 2000 Utah Ct.App. 47, Tfl3, 997 P.2d 903.
The entire record leading up to the entry of the Decree of Divorce is but 34 pages in
length. It is clear that none of the cited conditions of Ms. Foulger are noted to exist or even
alluded to in the record up to this time. These facts are not even disputed by Mr. Mitchell
in his Affidavit. (Addendum No. 5).
The Affidavit of Ruth Foulger clearly describes significant facts that did not exist
when the divorce was originally granted. (Record pp. 60 to 69). These facts were not
materially contested by Mr. Mitchell in his Affidavit. (Addendum Nos. 5 and 6). These
facts, as set forth in Mrs. Foulger's Affidavit, were to be taken by the court as proven at least
for purposes of the Motion. These asserted facts clearly justify a review of the property
issues as to whether or not the asset was omitted. At the very least, it sets forth a prima facie
case of a material change in circumstances. It does not compel the court to grant a
modification of the Decree of Divorce. However, the asserted facts are clearly sufficient to
withstand the granting of a Summary Judgment Motion.
A careful review of the District Court's record leading up to the entry of a Decree of
Divorce will also reveal that the retirement asset was not even identified in the indexed
record let alone addressed by the court in its Findings of Fact or the Decree of Divorce.
(Record pp. 1 to 34); (Addendum No. 1).
Res Judicata is Not a Total and
Complete Defense to a Modification Proceeding
Based Upon a Substantial Change in Circumstances.
The common law doctrine of res judicata applies to all divorce actions. Dallas
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Jacobsen v. Mary Jacobsen 703 P.2d 303 (I "lali IW^M'irpl'i Hu' UUIUIHUI law legal doctrine
in the absence of a change in circumstances).
ourt ultimately ruled that Mr. Mitchell' s retirement benefits that
accrued durim

, ••

»

,

res judicata. (Record pp. 134 to 135);

(Addendum Nos. 8 and 9). However, the record is i,"k\n lhal Hie ivlih menl asul h<i<l not
been addressed at all in the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 1 to 34). liven if n had IM vii
addressed, then it is still subject to a modification for good cause shown. UCA §30-3-5(3);
Ruth M. Dixon v. William R. Dixon I J! I t U. J>(), 240 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1952). The ruling
of the District < nun ivh'»|i\

(MI UTIU<J

"in1 presentation of the facts at trial establishing that

the retirement asset was never adjudicated or lhal Ilk1 mpmed 'Yause show n is present (fins
warranting a modification.
1

improperly applied a very strict interpretation of res judicata that is not

warranted under»ixi st in p ease law anil i i li*>hl <>! (In clear language of the statute.

.

UCA §30-3-5 has long been interpreted b\ Hi* \ nml ^ in irlas i m ilir i as* ml di\ <»rce
or family law proceedings), the common law rules which are used to maintain the sain I il v
judgments and decrees. Cora B. Hamilton v. Nathaniel M. Hamilton
89 Ut. 554,58P.2d 11 (Utah 19361 I lu r \ n plum (u Hie yuienil ruk- IN based upon the legal
premise that a substantial change in circumstances justifies a review of th«
court. Belle Codv v. J. J. Codv 47 U t 456,154 P. 952 (Utah 1916): Sheila Land v. William
Land II( )S |> 'M |'|l< (I Had 1 YM < u Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407 (Utah
Ct.App. 1990).
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The courts have declared that the legislature in adopting this statutory provision
intended to, and in fact did, enlarge the common law powers of the court regarding divorce
actions. This is a very clear declaration of public policy that overrides the common law.
This important public policy has long recognized that with the passage of time, even those
matters previously addressed by the courts in a Decree of Divorce may, because of new
developments, need to be reexamined and may be modified if the facts warrant such action.
For nearly a century, orders respecting the disposition of property have been held to be
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be modified upon proof of a
significant change in either personal or financial circumstances. Charles A. Doe v. Elfa L.
Doe 48 Ut. 200, 158 P. 781 (Utah 1916); Ruth M. Dixon v. William D. Dixon 121 Ut. 259,
240 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1952). The courts have also declared that the omission of an important
matter may itself constitute a significant change in circumstances. Laura Thompson v. Brent
Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985); Gary Egan v. Nancy Egan 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977)
(holding that a mistake is sufficient to challenge the appropriat eness of the original Order and
seek its modification).
Even in cases where property has been subject to division by an agreement or a
stipulation of the parties and which was specifically sanctioned by the trial court, these
agreements can be modified at a later date upon showing of good cause. Heidemarie G.
Foulger v. John C. Foulger 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981) (stating that an agreement to divide
property is subject to modification upon proof of a substantial change in circumstances);
Sheila Land v. William Land 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah Ct.App. 1980) (acknowledging that
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voluntary property settleme

modification for proper cause

shown); Lvnette Kinsman v. John Lee Kinsman 748 P.2d '"Id (Miali Ct.App

I'JXX)

(modifying a prior negotiated settlement agreement based upon a change in circumstances);
Robert (j. Nay lor v. Julia Lee Nay lor i\
is allowed based upon the provi

-

Utah 1985) (modification of the Decree

» ^

I.

Mr. Mitchell contends that until the Supreme Court's Woodward dm-simi was
rendered there was no equitable interest a wife could make in the retirement assets of the
other spouse. Marvin L. Woodward v. Mildred L. W oodward 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
This proposition is not supported by the nm lin < w .i l.i \ ili.il \\\ Inn \ w hal constitutes the
"marital estate". Kellie K. Jackson v. Mark Allen Jackson 617 P.2d 338 (i italu I %"!) i 11
addition, the fact that the court later decrees that a particular ruling on a given topic has
prospective diet I simply means that it would be proper to apply the rule of law in all later
matters or proceedings (11»11111 \ > I H ^ (111 i 11 I L v. 11 \ i M J 11 \ prospective ruling by a court;
does not always mean the law was clearly to the contran
ruling in question. In any event, the Modification Petition was filed after the prospective
i nl in;. , I'd led upon by the Appellee was issued. It is clear that under Utah case law private
retirement benefits ,n uittnibfi **

*(IIII(IJ"

Mir i u t t u g r ait marital assets,, The authority to

divide them was created by statute. UCA §30-3-5= In tlenl, ;ill jssets ill ii ihe panics fun .
be they marital or separate, is subject to adjustment or modification for good cause shown
in 11 iTivota.* ease,
i*.
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i dail K. Ihrockmorton v. Cecil D.

Throckmorton 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) also relied upon by the Appellee. In that
case, the claimed change in circumstances was based upon a supposed change in the law.
The Court of Appeals merely decreed that a change in the law standing alone is not sufficient
to constitute a change in circumstances within the meaning of the statute. The present case
is clearly factually different than the Throckmorton case.

In the present case, the

modification request is based upon two (2) alternative legal theories. The first theory is that
the asset was never addressed in the original proceed. The second theory is the existence of
a very significant and life altering changes in the former wife's actual needs, physical and
mental health, and her existing earning abilities. This is exactly what UCA §30-3-5(3)
contemplates when it authorizes a court to review anew divorce orders when the facts in the
case are significantly different.
The common law recognizes that when the facts have significantly changed, then the
common law doctrine of res judicata is not to be applied. The doctrine of res judicata has no
application where either: (i) the cause of action, or (ii) the issues involved in the subsequent
proceedings are not identical to those raised in the prior proceedings. See Am. Jur.2d
Judgments, §404 and §415. The doctrine cannot be applied when a different case is
presented which does not arise out of the very same set of facts as the prior decided case.
Searle Brothers, v. Edlean Searle 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978); International Resources v. C.
Robert Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979); David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah
Ct.App. 119, Tfl3, 977 P.2d 1218 (applying the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel).
For example, prior rulings in a continuing case can be re-opened in nondomestic civil
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cases, if certa

,, n^ State Bank v. Annie Cruz 95 lit, 320, 81 P.2d

359 (Utah 1938); Archie Thurston v. Box Elder County W? V M 11! i<( ,|! K.ilm I 'i r. i, I (icse
conditions are: (i) an intervening change in the law, (ii) when new evidence has bee .we
available, anu

wnen tne court is convinced the prior decision is clearly erroneous and

would work ^

i

Shirley Gillmor v. Dennis K. Wright 850 P.2d 431

(Utah 1993).
Mr. Mitchell vigorously declares that the Woodward case is new law. II " n 11 i 11"*.
then the Woodard case would clearly represent a signficant change in the law as to the
tiraliiiciil of (he iilireiiintl benefits. Marvin L. Woodward v. Mildred L. Woodward 656
P M \\\ 1111, ili I "'"K "

I his i dirjiliidi \ .in Intervening change in the law. Therefore, res

judicata is not a proper defer

proceeding is a new

cause of action under UCA §30-3-5(3) that is based on new facts or sipin Ik .nil i\ "Jiffei eniv
facts For these two (2) reasons, the legal defense of res judicata is not proper in this case.
T

-

t

in the decided c

significant legal issue, The Trial Court missed this important distinction
«.M and Ilk \n\\vimny staltik"

1 In: ruling of the Trial t ourt represents

a substantial deviation from the long established law and a 11 c \ i i 111 <) 11 (i <»111 (11 •" r - T • • 111 • I \\ <
law that implements the statute regarding the continuing legal and equitable authority of the
:djust property divisions for good cause shown. The current ruling, if it is
allowed to stand, does in deal nuke Mi'» I1 "iiljyi "j [nihil,,, charge ' which is contrary to the
declared public policy of this state.
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Res Judicata Bars Domestic Modification Proceedings
Only When the Petition Cannot Establish a Substantial
Change in Circumstances or the Existence of a Mistake of Fact.
The Appellee claims the Petition is barred from any type of relief by reason of the
common law doctrine of res judicata. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No 3). The Trial
Court ultimately adopted this legal conclusion.

(Record p.134 to 135; 148 to 150);

(Addendum Nos. 8 and 9). The District Court's legal ruling is erroneous.
As a general rule, the common law doctrine of res judicata puts at rest legal disputes
which have been fully addressed in a prior proceeding on the merits. However, when there
has been a substantial change in circumstances or where there has been a mistake of fact,
then res judicata does not apply in a domestic law proceeding. Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G.
Smith 793 P.2d 407(Utah Ct.App. 1990) (holding that a mistake of fact is sufficient to reject
the strict application of res judicata); Monte McLane v. B.A. McLane 570 P.2d 692 (Utah
1977) (rejecting a res judicata defense if a change in circumstances has arisen); Betty L.
Kessimakis v. Dale M. Kessimakis 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978) (rejecting ares judicata claim
where there has been a change in circumstances); Laura Thompson v. Brent Thompson 709
P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) (holding that the omission of a marital obligation justifies a
modification of the decree even though the parties were fully aware of the important facts).
Gary Egan v. Nancy Egan 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977) (holding that the issue of paternity
could properly be reviewed a second time by means of an independent action).
The Utah Court of Appeals has clearly held that where there has been a mistake of
fact, then res judicata will not be applied. Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407
-29-

(Utah Ct.App. 1990); David L. Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
A property division order can be modified where there has been a substantial change
in circumstances. Laura Thompson v. Brent Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) (holding
that the omission of a matter in the original divorce action can be the basis for a change in
the Decree of Divorce based upon changed circumstances).
The courts have long recognized that because family law matters are equitable in
nature, the application of the legal doctrine of res judicata is relaxed because the court has
continuing statutory jurisdiction over all family law matters. Laura Thompson v. Brent
Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985); Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
A Decree of Divorce which is wholly void of any reference to a matter and where the
record in the case is wholly lacking of an adjudication of a major marital asset, then res
judicata should not be strictly applied. The record clearly demonstrates that there has been
an omission of a significant asset from the original Decree of Divorce or at least a substantial
change in circumstances which was not foreseen at the time of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce. Frances R. Bolliger v. Ronald E. Bolliger 2000 Utah Ct.App. 47, ^[13, 997 P.2d
903. (Record pp. lto34).
In this case, the parties have failed by mistake or oversight to adjudicate the marital
retirement asset. This is a classic case of a mutual mistake. Mr. Mitchell, in his own
affidavit, fails to provide to the court any additional evidence that the court did in fact
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address the asset in some fashion. The ruling of the Trial Court should be reversed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
1.

The trial court incorrectly applied the wrong legal standard and failed to engage

in a two (2) step legal analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record pp. 134 to
135).
2.

The Trial Court failed to give the parties a reasonable amount of time to

conduct discovery and which is prejudicial error. (Record pp. 76 and 88).
3.

The court improperly applied res judicata to the case both contrary to the

common law and in derogation of the statutory right to the court to modify the prior orders
of the court for cause shown.
4.

The Trial Court failed to address the changed circumstances and that the

Petitioner has presented a prima facie case of modification under UCA §30-3-5.
DATED this 2\*fay of December, 2001.

W. KEVlN/rACKSON
Attorney pi
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
4885 South 900 East #208
Salt Lake City, UT 84117-5793
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this /-\^
2001.
wjk-mis/FOULG-BRF.APP

-32-

day of December,
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W.KEVIN JACKSON (1640)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379
Telephone: (801)531-6600
Facsimile: (801)521-3731

h,

:••''

,
, _(
' - .- TJTY
ov
"TtT-Ji TclEHK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
RUTH LEILA MITCHELL,
A/K/A RUTH FOULGER

:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

vs.

New Case No. 77-492-6438
OldCaseNo.D-26438

DONALD R. MITCHELL,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant/Respondent.

Commissioner Thomas N. Amett

oooOooo
TO: THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES;
COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through her attorney of record, W. Kevin Jackson,
and hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court of the State of Utah (subject to reassignment) from
the final judgment entered by the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the
above entitled matter and dated the 1st day of August, 2001. A copy of said Order granting the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and overruling the filed Objections and Dismissal of
the Petition to Modify is attached hereto. The final Order dismissed the Petition for Modification.
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The Appellant hereby tenders the required appeal fees and costs.
The parties to the judgment which is appealed from and the names and the addresses of
their respective attorneys of record are as follows:
NO.

NAME OF PARTY

ATTORNEY FOR PARTY

LEGAL ADDRESS

1

Donald R. Mitchell

Douglas T. Hall

4885 South 900 East #208
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

This notice of appeal is filed pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this ffv^day of August, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
4885 South 900 East #208
Salt Lake City, UT 84117-5793
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this

of August, 2001.

3/FOULG-DIV-NOT.APPL
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FILED DISTRICT COURT

DOUGLAS T.HALL (1305)
Attorney for Respondent
4885 South, 900 East. Suite 208
Salt Lake City. Utah 84117-5793
Telephone 801-259-5000
Facsimile 801-263-1426

Third Judicial District

Deputy ClerK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RUTH LEILA MITCHELL, aka RUTH
FOULGER,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

;|
|
[|

ORDER AFFIRMING
COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION

'

|

Case No.

D^m^^Jl'H^^^

|
|

Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
Commissioner Thomas N. Amett, Jr.

DONALD R. MITCHELL.
Defendant/Respondent.

Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation granting the
Respondent's motion for a summary judgment came on regularly for hearing on July 17 ,
2001, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding.

The Petitioner was present with her

attorney, W. Kevin Jackson. The Respondent was present with his attorney, Douglas T. Hall.
Counsel for both parties presented oral argument. The Court, having heard the argument of
counsel, having reviewed the file and the documents and exhibits therein, and now, being duly
apprised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, makes and enters the following
ORDER
1. The Commissioner for Domestic Relations correctly determined that the Utah
Court of Appeals rulings in the cases of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah
App. 1988), and Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), are controlling in the

. 1 -
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instant case: as is the doctrine of res judicata as it applies to the undisputed material facts in
this case.
2. The Commissioner ruled correctly that a new category of property rights is not
itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of circumstances.
3. The Commissioner was correct in recommending that, as a matter of law, the
Respondent was entitled to a summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's petitioner to
modify the Decree of Divorce.
4. Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation is overruled and the
Order of Summary Judgment, heretofore entered, is affirmed.
DATED this \ s

day of / fl/^/i

> /

2001.

BY T H E ^ Q J ^ ^ ^

BRUCE
District
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

W^tfeteji Jackson /
Attorney^ for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
first class postage pre-paid, this /^H* day of July, 2001, to the following:
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379
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